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ORIGINALITY
Gideon Parchomovsky* and Alex Stein**

I

N this Article we introduce a model of copyright law that calibrates
authors’ rights and liabilities to the level of originality in their works.
We advocate this model as a substitute for the extant regime that unjustly and inefficiently grants equal protection to all works satisfying the
“modicum of creativity” standard. Under our model, highly original
works will receive enhanced protection and their authors will also be
sheltered from suits by owners of preexisting works. Conversely, authors of less original works will receive diminished protection and incur
greater exposure to copyright liability. We operationalize this proposal
by designing separate rules for highly original works, for works exhibiting average originality, and for works that are minimally original or
unoriginal. We illustrate our rules’ application by showing how they
could have altered court decisions in classic copyright cases in a socially
beneficial way.

“[T]o make the copyright turnstile revolve, the author should
have to deposit more than a penny in the box . . . .”
Benjamin Kaplan1
INTRODUCTION
Originality is the sine qua non of copyrightability. A work must
be original to receive copyright protection. Yet, it is a very minimal
requirement.2 To prove originality, an author needs to show that
*

Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Bar-Ilan University Faculty of
Law, Israel.
**
George W. Crawford Visiting Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Professor of
Law, Cardozo Law School. We thank Barton Beebe, Abraham Bell, Ben Depoorter,
Bob Ellickson, Jim Gibson, Bobbi Kwall, and Peter Siegelman for insightful discussions and comments, and Taly Dvorkis and Lital Helman for superb research assistance.
1
An Unhurried View of Copyright 46 (1967).
2
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“Personality. . . . expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art
has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone. That something he may
copyright . . . .”) (Holmes, J.).
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the expression for which protection is sought originated with her
and was not copied from someone else. Once this showing is made,
an author only needs to demonstrate that her expression contains a
modicum of creativity3 and that it was fixed in a tangible medium
of expression4 in order to enjoy the full panoply of exclusive rights
and benefits under copyright law. Protection is granted indiscriminately to all expressive works, whether highly or only minimally
original.5
Copyright law fails to take the next step and calibrate the scope
of the copyright protection to the degree of the work’s originality.
Originality under the extant regime is a mere threshold requirement, and, moreover, one that can be easily satisfied.6 The problem
with the existing design is that by rewarding minimally original
works and highly original works alike, the law incentivizes authors
to produce works containing just enough originality to receive protection—but not more. This result is neither efficient nor just.
Whether one subscribes to utilitarian theories of copyright law or
to desert-based justifications, it appears that identical treatment of
all works, regardless of the level of originality, is a misguided idea.
From an efficiency perspective, the current approach incentivizes
production of too many works at the low end of the originality
spectrum and a suboptimal number of truly original works.7 From a

3

See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original,
as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created
by the author . . . and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”).
4
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (making eligible for copyright protection any original work of authorship “fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”).
5
We believe that owners of unoriginal works would suffer lesser damage from copyright infringements. The prospect of lesser damage could potentially increase an infringer’s chances to defeat the owner’s suit by the “fair use” defense. Cf. Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (observing that “‘the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work’ . . . is
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”). While this factor could
mitigate the overbreadth of copyright protection, it does so haphazardly and in a very
limited way.
6
Cf. Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 Duke L.J. 683, 704–16
(2003) (rationalizing the minimalist originality requirement as a cost-saving evidentiary device that allows courts to deny protection to works not exhibiting distinctiveness that makes it easy to establish copying).
7
For discussion, see infra Part II.
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fairness perspective, the distortion may be even greater as the just
reward of authors who made a significant contribution to society is
supposed to be much greater than for those who made a relatively
insignificant contribution.8
In this Article we set out to design a workable copyright system
that calibrates authors’ protection and liability to the originality
level of their works.9 We do not propose to revamp the current
definition of originality. We accept the two constituent elements of
that definition—independent creation by the author and creativity—but treat them as continuums, rather than thresholds, and then
vary the rules of copyright protection and liability in accordance
with the degree of creativity of works. Under our proposed design,
authors of highly original works will not only receive greater protection, but will also be sheltered from liability if sued for infringement by owners of preexisting works. Conversely, creators of
minimally original works will receive little protection and incur
greater exposure to liability if sued by others.
To operationalize our vision of copyright law, we introduce three
legal mechanisms that combine substantive standards with evidentiary rules. Although each of our mechanisms is designed differently, they all share the common goal of inducing creation of original expression, either by rewarding authors of highly creative
works or by penalizing authors of minimally original or completely
unoriginal ones.
Our first mechanism is called “the doctrine of inequivalents” and
is designed to afford the maximum degree of protection to exceptionally original works. Authors of works that incorporate uniquely
high originality and creativity will not only receive the maximum

8

For discussion of this idea, see infra Part II.
For a more restrictive approach that imports the patent law nonobviousness requirement into copyright law, see Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1361040. For discussions of this proposal, see Justin Hughes,
Should Copyright’s Originality Standard be Sort-of Non-obviousness? 2 (Apr. 5,
2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://blog.richmond.edu/ipi/article1/commentators/); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Hoisting Originality: A Response 1
(Apr. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://blog.richmond.edu/ipi/article1/commentators/); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 Hous.
L. Rev. 871, 874 (2007) (analyzing the relationship between the minimalist originality
standard of copyright law and moral rights).
9
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possible copyright protection, but will also be sheltered from liability for infringing the works of others.
Our second mechanism, “the added value doctrine,” will govern
infringement actions involving works of standard or average originality. It will require courts to compare the relative originality of
the plaintiff’s work with that of the defendant. If a court determines that the original contribution of the defendant is equal to or
greater than that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff will be denied injunctive relief and be awarded market value compensation instead.
This remedial shift from injunctions to damages10 is designed to
balance the competing demands of works of average originality by
ensuring that original works are not suppressed from the market.
Our third and final mechanism, “the sameness rule,” will regulate copyright conflicts that involve minimally original or nonoriginal works. The rule will create a rebuttable presumption of
copying when an allegedly infringing work containing minimal
originality is substantively similar to the plaintiff’s work. The presumption will be removed if the defendant successfully shows independent creation or the existence of a prior common source
from which both works are borrowed.
As we will demonstrate, implementation of our proposed mechanisms will increase the benefits and reduce the costs associated
with copyright protection. By putting a positive and a negative premium on originality, our framework will encourage creators to focus on the original content of their works and thereby enhance
their contributions to society. At the same time, our proposal will
also scale back the protection currently granted to multiple existing
works and by so doing will clear the path for future creativity. Indeed, we will show how our mechanisms could have altered the
analysis of classic copyright cases in a way that might have benefitted society.
It should be emphasized that in designing our mechanisms, we
were mindful of the constraints faced by adjudicators and were
10

The classic taxonomy of Calabresi and Melamed would categorize this shift as a
substitution of the property-rule protection for a liability rule. See Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092–93, 1105–07 (1972). For a detailed discussion of the possibility and desirability of such substitutions, see Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 59–64 (2002).
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therefore careful to craft them in a way that will enable their use in
practice. Hence, the adoption of our framework will not require
adjudicators to make determinations they do not make already,
nor will it require them to opine on the inherent value of art and
expression more than they do so now.
Structurally, the Article unfolds in three parts. In Part I, we will
discuss the overbreadth problem of the extant copyright regime
and its adverse effect on future creativity. We will show that over
time the protection accorded to existing authors has become excessive to the point that it threatens to undermine copyright law’s very
goal of underwriting a rich expressive domain. In Part II, we will
make the theoretical case for a copyright system that correlates
protection and liability to works’ originality. We posit that both efficiency and fairness-based justifications support this vision. We
will also identify possible objections to this vision of copyright law
and demonstrate that these objections are not compelling. We will
then specify the design principles that should guide policymakers in
creating an originality-based copyright law. Finally, in Part III, we
will introduce our specific mechanisms for reforming copyright law,
explain how they can be implemented in practice, and demonstrate
their superiority over the existing legal rules and adjudicatory
tools.
I. COPYRIGHT’S OVERBREADTH
In assessing the breadth, or strength, of a property regime, it is
important to pay heed to four distinct aspects of the problem. First,
one must look at the rules governing acquisition of rights. Second,
one must analyze the scope of rights (or dominion) of the owner.
Third, one must examine the ease with which the owner may successfully assert her rights against others. Finally, one must consider
the remedies the law grants to an owner whose rights have been
violated. Looking at copyright law from this perspective reveals
that right-holders enjoy very broad protection on each dimension
and even more so in the aggregate.
Begin with the rules of acquisition. Copyrights may well be the
easiest property rights to acquire. Copyright law sets two main prerequisites for acquisition of rights: the work in which rights are
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sought must be original and must be fixed in a tangible medium of
expression.11 Both requirements set a very low threshold for obtaining protection, even in combination. The originality requirement
demands that the person seeking copyright protection originated
the work. Restated in the negative, originality requires that a person wishing to obtain rights in a work of expression did not copy
the work from someone else. In the landmark decision Feist v. Rural,12 the Supreme Court raised the originality bar somewhat by interpreting the requirement to incorporate a demand for “a modicum of creativity.”13 Therefore, to satisfy the requirement after
Feist, an author needs to show that she composed her work and
that it contains a minimal amount of creativity.
The fixation requirement is even easier to meet. Under the
Copyright Act, fixation does not require a specific form: any physical embodiment satisfies the requirement. Furthermore, the law
does not require a permanent or even long-lasting fixation. Quite
the contrary, even temporary or transient fixation that lasts for a
very brief period of time will suffice. For example, in MAI v.
Peak,14 the Ninth Circuit ruled that a temporary copy of a program,
generated by turning a computer on, qualifies as fixation under the
Copyright Act, even though the copy vanishes once the computer
is turned off.15
It should be noted that originality and fixation, the “gatekeepers” of copyright law, fall short of the “gatekeepers” employed by
patent law. Patent law requires inventions to be useful, novel, and
nonobvious to “a person having ordinary skill in the art.”16 The usefulness requirement ensures that the claimed invention succeeds in

11

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
13
Id. at 346.
14
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
15
Id. at 518 (“[B]y showing that Peak loads the software into the RAM and is then
able to view the system error log and diagnose the problem with the computer, MAI
has adequately shown that the representation created in the RAM is ‘sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.’”).
16
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); see also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 844 (1990) (“To be patentable an invention must meet all the statutory requirements for patentability: novelty, utility and non-obviousness.”).
12
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attaining the goal or function described in the application.17 The
novelty requirement prescribes that an invention must be new in
order to qualify for patent protection.18 Finally, the nonobviousness
requirement obliges an inventor to prove that her innovation
marks a non-trivial improvement over the prior art.19 Unlike copyright law, patent law requires inventions to undergo examination to
ensure compliance with the statutory prerequisites prior to the
grant of protection. Copyright law never incorporated an examination process and, strictly speaking, even registration is not required
to secure protection.20 It should be noted here that copyrights are
rights in rem that avail against the rest of the world. Their recognition is not cost free.21 As rights in rem, copyrights impose a duty on
all members of our society to comply with the rights of the holder.
This effect is of particular note in a democratic society since copy-

17
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2005). Additionally, the invention must be workable, since inoperative or nonsensical
inventions will not be considered useful. See CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349
F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
18
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); see also Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch:
A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 Ark. L. Rev. 773, 785
(2004) (“The novelty requirement means that the invention must be new and not previously patented, described, or otherwise anticipated.”); David W. Opderbeck, Patent
Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 127, 168 (2009) (explaining that an invention “is non-obvious only if, given the state of all the relevant
prior art at the time of the invention, a person of ordinary skill in the art would consider the invention non-obvious” and that “the patent examiner or the court is required to put itself into the shoes of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
the invention in order to make the . . . determination . . . of the claimed invention’s
‘specific contribution’ over the prior art”).
19
See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)
(“Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.”); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 415–26 (2007) (applying Graham’s criteria and invalidating patent on obviousness grounds).
20
See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006). Registration of copyrights still provides owners
with practical advantages. See infra note 50.
21
Cf. James Wilson, Could there be a Right to Own Intellectual Property?, 28 L. &
Phil. 393 (2009) (demonstrating that the moral case for recognizing intellectual property ownership is also far from obvious).
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rights constrain others’ freedom of expression. Furthermore, since
copyright law grants owners exclusive rights it raises the specter of
monopolistic pricing. As a result, certain users who value works at
more than their competitive price, but are unwilling or unable to
pay the right-holder’s extortionary premium, will not acquire the
works. Finally, copyrights also generate enforcement costs. Some
of these costs are borne by the copyright holders themselves, but
others are shouldered by society. The state puts its law enforcement machinery—courts, agencies, and the police—at the disposal
of copyright holders in order to help them vindicate their rights
and generate deterrence against putative infringers.
As far as the aspect of dominion is concerned, copyright law
grants to authors six exclusive rights in their works. Section 106 of
the Copyright Act confers upon authors the right of reproduction,
adaptation, distribution, public performance, public display, and
digital performance (in the case of sound recordings).22 These exclusive rights do not exhaust all possible uses of expressive works:
for example, one can freely perform a work privately or consume a
work by reading or listening to it. Yet, they do put a very wide
range of activities under the exclusive control of the copyright
owner.23
To be sure, the Act also sets certain limitations on the dominion
of the owner. But the limitations are either very narrow and specific24 or very vague and complex.25 As Professor James Gibson re22

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
Id.
24
Such narrow exceptions include, inter alia, the use of copyrighted works in the
framework of nonprofit, face-to-face teaching events, nonprofit informative religious
services, or public broadcasts for the blind. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 110 (2006).
25
For example, 17 U.S.C. § 107 defines a general exception for the “fair use” of
copyrighted works, which requires courts to employ a balancing test that includes four
specific factors. The scope and limits of the fair use standard have been subject to
various debates and criticism owing mainly to the doctrine’s lack of clarity. See, e.g.,
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005,
156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 549–50 (2008) (describing the fair use doctrine as enigmatic
and developing an empirical account of its applications by courts); see also Lawrence
Lessig, Free Culture 187 (2004) (“[F]air use in America simply means the right to hire
a lawyer . . . .”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93
Va. L. Rev. 1483, 1484–91 (2007) (attesting that applications of the fair use doctrine
are unpredictable and proposing establishment of nonexclusive bright-line rules that
will define per se fair uses); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (stating the complex mechanisms for compulsory licenses).
23

PARCHOMOVSKY&STEIN_BOOK

2009]

9/17/2009 5:37 PM

Originality

1513

cently noted, the architecture of rights and limitations in the Copyright Act—in combination with the ease of suing infringers and the
remedies provided by the Act, which we discuss below—generates
an unceasing dynamic of expansion of the copyright holders’ dominion at the expense of users.26 Specifically, Gibson demonstrated
that the vagueness of the various limitations and defenses generated a high degree of uncertainty among users regarding the scope
and content of their privileges, which in turn prompted them to pay
copyright owners a license fee rather than risk litigation.27
Copyrights are also limited in time.28 But the current protection
term—life of the author plus 70 years—gives copyright owners at
least 99.8% of the value they could extract if the protection were to
last in perpetuity.29 Furthermore, as life expectancy increases, so
will the term of the protection. Finally, there is always a possibility
that Congress will decide to extend the term as it has several times
in the past.30 Hence, the finite duration proviso is no longer a meaningful limitation on the dominion of copyright owners, and in the
future it may become virtually irrelevant—if it has not become so
already.
Let us turn to the third aspect: the ease with which copyright
owners can vindicate their rights against putative infringers. Here,
too, copyright law favors plaintiffs. To succeed in an infringement
suit, a plaintiff needs to show copying and improper appropriation
by the defendant. The terminology, however, is misleading. Importantly, courts do not require plaintiffs to prove actual copying. Instead, courts use access and similarity as proxies for copying. Accordingly, in order to prevail in an infringement suit, the plaintiff
needs to show that the defendant had access to her work and that
there are similarities between the two works. Access in copyright
infringement actions is typically proved by circumstantial evidence.
If the plaintiff’s work achieved commercial success, or was widely

26

See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 884 (2007).
27
Id. at 887–906.
28
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
29
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255–56 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30
Congress extended the duration of copyrights in several instances, principally in
1831, 1909, 1976, and 1998. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192, 222 (2003) (dismissing constitutional challenges to the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998).
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disseminated, access will be inferred.31 Furthermore, copyright liability does not depend on the mental state of the defendant. Innocent copying and even subconscious copying suffice to give rise to
liability.32 Copyright law thus effectively establishes a strict liability
regime.33
The plaintiff also must prove improper appropriation. This requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant borrowed protected
elements from her work. This showing is necessary to ensure that
the similarity between the two works is not due to the presence of
the same unprotected elements in both works. On its face, the unlawful appropriation inquiry may appear to be an important check
on the power of copyright owners to bring infringement suits
against others. The unlawful appropriation requirement, however,
does not raise a significant bar for plaintiffs. As one commentator
observed, “new creative works almost invariably borrow from old
creative works, which raises the possibility of infringement on the
part of the borrower.”34
As for the fourth and final aspect, remedies, copyright law furnishes an impressive array of remedies to successful plaintiffs, including injunctions and supra-compensatory damages.35 Courts also
have broad discretion to issue preliminary injunctions.36 While preliminary injunctions are difficult to secure in other contexts, courts
tend to grant them as a matter of course in copyright infringement
cases without requiring a showing of irreparable harm, so long as
the plaintiff can demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.37
The ease with which preliminary injunctions are issued in copyright
infringement cases is highly significant since most cases do not go
31

Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482–83 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 482–85 (affirming imposition of liability for subconscious copying); Bright
Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(holding George Harrison liable for subconsciously infringing the copyright in the
plaintiff’s song). For criticism, see Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy:
Copyright, Creation and Context, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 477, 531–39 (2007).
33
See, e.g., David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 139, 152
(2009) (“Direct copyright infringement remains a strict liability offense, and even a
relatively minor unauthorized use can result in major liability if the owner has registered the work and chooses to claim statutory damages.”).
34
Gibson, supra note 26, at 887.
35
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (2006).
36
Id. § 502.
37
Gibson, supra note 26, at 890.
32
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beyond this stage. Faced with a preliminary injunction, most defendants elect not to proceed with the trial and choose to settle the
case instead.38
In addition, the Copyright Act allows successful plaintiffs to collect both the compensation for the losses they suffered as a result
of the infringement,39 as well as the defendants’ profits.40 In the alternative, the Act entitles plaintiffs to seek statutory damages
without proof of harm. The Act prescribes that statutory damages
must range from $750 to $150,000 per work infringed, while leaving
courts the discretion to set the actual amount based on the circumstances of the case.41 Finally, the Act authorizes courts to order the
impounding and destruction of infringing articles.42
In light of this analysis, it is not at all surprising that many copyright scholars believe that copyright protection goes overboard.43
Indeed, there is virtual consensus among theorists that copyright
law offers excessive protection to existing authors and does so at
the expense of future creators. Professor Yochai Benkler, for example, has decried the “enclosure movement” in copyright law,
pointing out that many uses of expressive works that were considered legitimate in the past can no longer be carried out without
permission from the right-holder.44 Referring to the same dynamic,
Professor Pamela Samuelson colorfully termed it the “copyright
grab.”45 Moreover, Professor Lawrence Lessig cautioned that if the
38
Id. at 944–45. Gibson notes that plaintiffs take advantage of courts’ willingness to
issue preliminary injunctions in order to “keep[] cases from reaching a substantive
ruling that might clarify feedback-fueling gray areas.” Id.
39
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006).
40
Id.
41
Id. § 504(c)(1)–(2). If the infringement is not willful, the maximum amount a
plaintiff can collect is $30,000. Id. § 504(c)(1). The minimum damage award for goodfaith infringements is $200. Id. § 504(c)(2).
42
Id. § 503.
43
See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox 54–80 (2008) (discussing
“copyright’s ungainly expansion”); Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 Colum.
J.L. & Arts 587, 587 (2008) (attesting that rights granted by copyright law underwent
extraordinary expansion over the past fifty years); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 537, 543–48
(2007) (attesting that copyright protection and liability for copyright infringement are
excessive).
44
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 354–60 (1999).
45
Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, Wired, Jan. 1996, at 134.
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trend of expansion in copyright law is not arrested, it will put future creativity at risk.46 Finally, Siva Vaidhyanathan best captured
the essence of the problem when he concluded that “[copyright]
law has lost sight of its original charge: to encourage creativity, science, and democracy. . . . [it] rewards works already created and
limits works yet to be created.”47
In the next Part, we develop a proposal to redesign copyright law
in a way that fixes this defect. Specifically, we make a case for a
copyright regime that correlates authors’ protection and potential
liability to the level of originality and creativity in their works. We
demonstrate that our proposal has the potential not only to remedy
the overbreadth problem that currently plagues copyright law, but
also to enhance the originality and creativity of expressive works
and thus enrich the domains of art, culture, and technology.
II. ORIGINALITY-BASED COPYRIGHTS
In this Part, we lay out a normative case for correlating copyright
protection and liability with the originality of works of authorship.
We submit that originality-based copyright law can curtail the
overbreadth problem we discussed in Part I, as well as improve the
utility and fairness of the current regime.
Our definition of originality is qualitatively similar to that used
by the courts. Originality subsists in independently created expressive elements and embodies a demand for a certain level of creativity. Rather than a threshold requirement, we conceive of originality
as a continuum and set out to redesign copyright law in accordance
with this vision. We argue that a high level of originality should entitle the author to a higher degree of protection against unauthorized uses, as well as shelter her, to varying degrees, against liability
for borrowing from others. Conversely, a low originality level
should qualify authors to minimal protection under the Copyright
Act and expose them to enhanced liability if they borrowed from
preexisting works.48
46

Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected
World (2001).
47
Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens Creativity 4 (2001).
48
Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 Mich. L. Rev.
285, 288–90 (2008) (conceptualizing tort liability rules as taxes and subsidies for inno-
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We adopt the originality criterion for a number of reasons. The
first reason is benefit to society. United States copyright law is
grounded in utilitarian philosophy. The Intellectual Property
Clause in the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”49 On this view, copyright protection is a means to an end. Its raison d’être is to enrich the domain of expression and thereby improve the well-being of society.
Naturally, only original works promote social welfare. Society has
no interest in protecting unoriginal works that effect no advancements in art, literature, science, education, or other useful endeavors.
The analysis should not stop here, however. Under the extant
regime, originality is a mere threshold requirement, and, moreover,
one that minimally original works satisfy as well. The problem with
this design is that it fails to differentiate between different levels of
originality. By rewarding minimally original works and highly original works alike, the existing law incentivizes authors to produce
works containing just enough originality to receive protection, but
not more. From a societal viewpoint, however, the degree of originality matters. Presumably, the more original works generate a
greater benefit for society. Yet, this fact is not embedded in the
current regime. If society wishes to encourage authors to produce
highly original works and not settle for the bare minimum necessary to secure protection, it must reflect this preference in the design of the law. That is, it ought to increase the amount of protection and decrease the potential liability of authors whose works
incorporate a high degree of originality. Conversely, it ought to decrease the amount of protection and increase the potential liability
of authors who produce minimally original works. These measures
will prompt authors to focus on the originality factor, and thereby
align their private interests with the broader social interest.
An additional justification for our proposal has to do with cost.
Copyright protection generates four types of cost. The first type is

vators, on the one hand, and for replicators and users of conventional knowledge, on
the other hand, and calling for the removal of rules that chill innovation).
49
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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the cost of establishing and maintaining a system of copyright protection. To enable the system to operate, it was necessary to pass
elaborate legislation that defines the relevant rights, powers, and
privileges of authors. Then, it became necessary to set up a special
administrative agency, the Copyright Office, to administer the registration of rights.50 Like other administrative agencies, the Copyright Office is funded by society. Society also bears the cost of
criminal enforcement against copyright violators51 and of the resolution of private copyright disputes that find their way to the court
system.
The second type of cost is monopolistic pricing. At least in some
cases, copyright law, through its grant of exclusivity, bestows upon
right-holders enough market power to charge monopolistic supracompetitive prices.52 As a result, some buyers who would have pur-

50

Although registration is no longer mandatory, it offers three distinct benefits to
copyright owners. First, it establishes prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate in judicial proceedings. 17 U.S.C.
§ 410(c) (2006). Second, subject to certain exceptions, it serves as a prerequisite for
commencing a copyright infringement suit. Id. § 411(a). Third, it serves as a precondition for awarding statutory damages and attorney’s fees in judicial proceedings, while
only an award of actual damages and profits is available in the absence of registration.
Id. § 412.
51
See, e.g., Id. §§ 506, 1204(a). Congress recently showed an inclination to expand
criminal liability for copyright violations. See Eric Goldman, Warez Trading and
Criminal Copyright Infringement, 51 J. Copyright Soc’y USA 395, 396 (2004). This
development will increase the costs of criminal enforcement. The recent Pro-IP Act,
officially called the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property
Act of 2008, exacerbates those costs by stiffening the penalties for all intellectual
property violations and by appointing a special “IP Czar” to oversee the enforcement
of those penalties. Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 17 U.S.C. (2006)).
52
See, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination,
8 Res. L. & Econ. 181, 184 (1986) (associating copyright ownership with pricing monopoly); Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 524
(2004) (explaining that copyright “creates deadweight losses in markets for expression” because “exclusive rights . . . enable the creator to charge a supracompetitive
price” and “[c]onsequently, access to the work will be denied to those who value it in
excess of the competitive price, but less than the supracompetitive price that the monopolist is able to command”); see also Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 317, 325-32 (2005)
(analyzing anti-competitive effects of copyright’s derivative rights and whether the
rights’ benefits offset those effects); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 212, 220–24 (2004) (arguing for a “differentiated
products” model for copyrights as a basis for monopolistic competition).
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chased copyrighted works at their competitive price must forego
the transaction and do without the works.
The third cost is political rent-seeking. This cost is related to, yet
analytically distinct from, the problem of monopoly. By providing a
legal structure that allows for supra-competitive profits, copyright
law creates rents over which various interest groups compete.
Rent-seeking is an inherently wasteful activity.53 It diverts resources to non-productive uses, such as political lobbying, that often yield socially suboptimal legislation or regulation.54 Indeed, as
Professor Jessica Litman has pointed out, interest-group politics
play a key role in shaping our copyright law,55 and many other
scholars believe that the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998
was powered through by Disney.56
The fourth and final cost is the adverse impact of copyright on
future creativity. The magnitude of this cost is a direct function of
the breadth of copyright protection accorded to existing authors.
The broader the scope of the protection, the costlier it becomes for
aspiring authors to produce their works. In a world with extremely
broad protection, aspiring authors will either have to create completely original works or secure permission from prior authors. As
53

See Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 Kyklos 575, 576 (1982).
Fred McChesney succinctly described it as “money for nothing.” See Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion 3
(1997).
55
See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 857, 903 (1987) (claiming that in considering the 1976 Copyright Act,
Congress relied heavily on industry specialists); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright
Law for the Information Age, 75 Or. L. Rev. 19, 22–23 (1996) (demonstrating copyright laws’ bias in favor of industry players).
56
Professor Lessig termed the legislation the “Mickey Mouse Protection Act.” See
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1057, 1065 (2001);
see also Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 23 (2001) (describing Disney’s lobbying effort at protecting Mickey Mouse for an additional twenty years); Lawrence Lessig,
How I Lost the Big One, Legal Affairs, Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 57, 58; Christopher Sprigman, The Mouse that Ate the Public Domain: Disney, The Copyright Term Extension
Act, and Eldred v. Ashcroft, FindLaw’s Writ, Mar. 5, 2002, http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305_sprigman.html (“Rather than allow
Mickey and friends to enter the public domain, Disney and its friends—a group of
Hollywood studios, music labels, and PACs representing content owners—told Congress that they wanted an extension bill passed. Prompted perhaps by the Disney
group’s lavish donations of campaign cash—more than $6.3 million in 1997–98, according to the nonprofit Center for Responsive Politics—Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.”).
54
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is the case with any property regime, the need to secure permission
may give rise to the spectre of holdups. But in the copyright context, a greater problem lurks: the vastness of the universe of copyrighted works makes it virtually impossible to identify the relevant
rights-holders and negotiate with them. Worse yet, the same reason
makes it impracticable for future authors to engage in comprehensive preemption searches, without which they can never be sure
that their works are completely original.
Our proposal does not concern the first three costs; it targets the
fourth. Given the high information costs that exist in the field of
copyright law,57 the only workable way to afford elbow room for future creators is by narrowing copyright protection based on the
originality criterion. Varying protection based on originality will
reduce the ability of authors of minimally original works to bring
infringement suits against subsequent creators. This should help
clear the path for future authors by lowering the cost of producing
new works. In property parlance, it may be said that our proposal
seeks to minimize the blocking effect of prior expressive assets by
reconfiguring their size.58 Our proposal can also be justified on
fairness grounds. Economic justifications focus almost invariably
on individuals’ ex ante incentives for action.59 Fairness-based justifications, in contrast, predominantly take an ex post approach.60 A
fairness-driven theory that is often invoked to justify copyright protection focuses on desert. Under this theory, authors deserve to be
rewarded for their labor and the contribution they made to soci-

57
See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 465,
500–18 (2004) (explaining that copyright law imposes high information costs on potential infringers, but also reduces those costs by allowing independent-creation and
other defenses to defeat owners’ suits).
58
See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in
Three Dimensions, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1015, 1051–53 (2008) (justifying regulation and
other measures against owner-initiated configurations of assets that impose externalities on others).
59
See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129, 129–30 (2004); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare . . . .”).
60
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 11 (1984).
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ety.61 From this perspective, too, an author’s rewards should correlate with either her effort or her contribution to society. Awarding
the same protection to works that are highly original and works
that exhibit scant originality (or no originality whatsoever) is unfair. Allowing authors of minimally original works to block the
creation of novel works, more original than theirs, is also unjust.
This unfairness is far from being an unavoidable consequence of
copyright ownership. The existence and scope of copyright protection are both matters of social choice, and society should make this
choice wisely. It can and should condition that protection on the
size of the benefit that the protected work brings to society.
A workable originality-based system of copyright protection
must combine flexibility and commitment. The system’s rules must
be flexible enough to allow courts to adjust the protection of copyrighted works to their level of originality. Rigid rules would impair
the adjudicators’ ability to make these case-specific adjustments.
Courts’ decisions on copyright liability and remedies cannot be
completely discretionary, though. The system needs to give authors
a credible assurance that its protection of copyright on the ground
will actually correspond to the underlying work’s originality. Failure to provide this assurance would not allow the system to eliminate the perverse incentives that exist under extant law.
Our system attains the twin goals of flexibility and commitment
to originality. It creates a synergy between the substantive standards of copyright protection and the evidentiary rules that implement those standards.62 The substantive standards we recommend
are flexible. They will allow courts to make case-by-case assessments of works’ originality. Evidentiary rules that accompany
those standards will systematically influence courts’ decisions in favor of original creators and against authors whose works exhibit
61

See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 297–
310 (1988) (providing an insightful and comprehensive account of labor-based justifications of intellectual property); see also Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and
the United States, 22 Colum. J.L. & Arts 361, 361–62 (1998) (discussing artists’
“moral rights” in their artwork).
62
This methodology originates from Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 Geo. L.J. 1743, 1746 (2005); see also Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law 17–25, 133–53 (2005) (explicating the capacity of evidentiary rules to optimize law-enforcement by allocating the risk of error in adjudicative fact-finding).
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scant or no originality. This skewing will credibly signal the system’s commitment to originality. Developers of original works will
consequently be able to count on and benefit from that commitment.
Before we introduce our specific mechanisms for improving copyright law, we wish to address two possible objections. The first objection is predicated on the concern that our proposal may lead to
excessive originality. This objection questions the utility of legal
rules designed to induce authors to produce original works. Arguably, those rules may force out excessive originality, which will
be wasteful or otherwise detrimental to society.
We do not dispute that originality has an optimal amount. But
this amount is difficult to ascertain, and our proposed system does
not even begin to address it. We doubt that anyone can ever identify the optimal amount of originality in arts and literature. Adoption of this unrealistically perfectionist, if not utopian, criterion for
reforming copyright law would forestall any attempt at improving
the law. We take a modest position on the quantum of originality
issue. We believe that society should reflect its interest in original
works in the design of copyright law. Our goal is to reduce the obvious distortions that prevent copyright law from achieving its
stated goals.
The second objection goes to the practicality of our proposal. In
an oft-cited paragraph, Justice Holmes cautioned that “[i]t would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”63 Echoing
Justice Holmes, one may wonder whether judges are qualified to
implement our proposal. We believe that this concern is misplaced
for a number of reasons. To begin with, we do not require judges to
make determinations about the intrinsic value of art, or even what
constitutes art. Justice Holmes wrote his famous sentence in response to Justice Harlan’s opinion stating that advertisements
should be denied copyright protection because they do not constitute art.64 Our proposal does not touch on that issue. Indeed, we do
not address this question at all. We clearly do not seek to bar pro63
64

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
Id. at 253 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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tection to any expressive or art form. Quite the opposite; we accept
Justice Holmes’ view that the public ought to have the power to
decide what art is.
We merely assign courts the task of determining an expressive
work’s level of originality. Courts are not only capable of performing this task, but they already do so. Every infringement suit requires the court to identify the original elements in the works involved and decide whether the defendant appropriated original
expression from the plaintiff’s work.65 Furthermore, whenever a defendant raises a fair use defense, the court must assess the level of
transformativeness in her work as part of the analysis. In doing so,
judges assess the level of originality and creativity in the allegedly
infringing work.66 In appropriate cases, judges can seek assistance
from expert witnesses in making originality determinations, as they
do already.67 This means that courts are quite adept at making
originality determinations and that our proposal will not present
them with a new challenge.
III. THE MECHANICS OF ORIGINALITY-BASED COPYRIGHTS
In this Part, we introduce a set of rules designed to calibrate the
scope of a work’s protection to its level of originality. Our rules
have two goals. First, they aim to strengthen the protection granted
to authors of highly original works by increasing the level of pro-

65

The subtractive approach (an important method for determining unlawful appropriation in copyright infringement suits) requires courts to remove from their consideration the unoriginal and other unprotected elements of the plaintiff’s work in order
to determine whether there is sufficient similarity between the defendant’s work and
the protectable elements of the plaintiff’s work. See David Nimmer et al., A Structured
Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright
Infringement Cases, 20 Ariz. St. L.J. 625, 635 (1988); see also Alexander v. Haley, 460
F. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding no substantial similarity between the protectable, as opposed to non-protectable, elements of the plaintiff’s novel and the defendant’s book). The “Abstract-Filtration-Comparison” test for software-related copyright suits also entails assessment of works’ originality. See Computer Assocs. Int’l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–12 (2d Cir. 1992).
66
See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105,
1111 (1990) (demonstrating that transformativeness is critical to whether a use “fulfill[ed] the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity” and arguing that creative
use might be justified despite a copyright owner’s objection).
67
For one such example, see Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, 420
F. Supp. 177, 178 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also infra note 68.
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tection to which they will be entitled. Second, they reduce—and, in
appropriate cases, completely eliminate—those authors’ exposure
to liability for infringement. Our rules will bring about the opposite
result for authors of works exhibiting scant originality by scaling
down their works’ protection correspondingly with the low originality level. The decrease we propose will not stop at a zeroprotection: authors of completely unoriginal works will receive
“negative protection” in the form of an increased prospect of copyright liability.
To achieve these effects, we reformulate the substantive standards of copyright law and adjust the evidentiary doctrines that accompany those standards. Specifically, we divide the domain of expressive works into three categories. The first category consists of
exceptionally original works. The second is comprised of a wide variety of works that exhibit regular or average originality. The third
accommodates works that are almost or completely unoriginal.
Under our proposed system, exceptionally original works will
entitle their authors to a sword and a shield. Authors of such works
will both receive very broad protection against infringements and
be sheltered from copyright liability. Works in the second category
will not enjoy the privileged status of works that belong to the first
category. The protection and liability of those works’ authors will
depend on the relative originality of each work. In resolving conflicts between those works, courts will compare the level of originality of the plaintiff’s work with that of the defendant’s work. If
the plaintiff’s work is more original than the defendant’s, the plaintiff will prevail. Upon winning this originality competition, the
plaintiff will be able to collect damages but not injunctive relief.
Finally, authors of the scantly original or altogether unoriginal
works that fall into the third category will receive no protection at
all. Those authors will also assume liability for imitating works of
others.
To operationalize our scheme, we introduce three legal mechanisms: “the doctrine of inequivalents,” “the added-value doctrine,”
and “the sameness rule.” Each of these mechanisms is designed to
apply in one of our originality categories. Our first mechanism, the
inequivalents doctrine, will apply to the category of exceptionally
original works. The second, the added-value doctrine, will govern
disputes between works of average originality. Finally, the same-
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ness rule will regulate conflicts involving minimally original or unoriginal works. In the remainder of this Part, we explain in detail
how courts should apply our proposed mechanisms. We also compare our mechanisms to the rules that copyright law currently employs, and show that these mechanisms outperform extant copyright rules by any chosen criterion of efficiency and fairness.
A. The Doctrine of Inequivalents
The doctrine of inequivalents will exempt the defendant from
copyright infringement liability when her work is exceptionally
original and creative. The work’s exceptional creativity may be
self-evident, so that a court can verify it without recourse to expert
testimony. Alternatively, the work’s exceptional creativity could be
established by reliance on the testimonies of experts from the relevant industry. The experts will rely on the same knowledge they
presently invoke in copyright trials when they testify about works’
similarity and success on the market.68
In either case, an alleged infringer who borrowed from a copyrighted work and seeks to rely on the doctrine of inequivalents will
have to establish her work’s exceptional creativity—or inequivalence—by clear and convincing evidence. This evidentiary requirement will minimize the number of court decisions that erroneously grant works an inequivalence status.69 As a result, only
highly original and creative works will earn the safe harbor of “exceptional creativity.” Authors of those truly exceptional works will
consequently be immunized against infringement suits by prior authors from whose works they borrowed.
68

See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 952–
54 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (relying on expert testimony to find a market for
non-infringing uses of peer-to-peer software and to quantify the volume of infringement); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
that “[t]he extrinsic test [of works’ substantial similarity] often requires analytical dissection of a work and expert testimony.” (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994))); Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 887 (2d
Cir. 1997) (relying on expert testimony in determining “harmonic similarities” between musical works); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing the use of expert testimony for
the extrinsic test on substantial similarity); see also Sturdza v. U.A.E., 281 F.3d 1287,
1300 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (observing that courts adjudicating copyright cases increasingly
rely on experts).
69
See Stein, supra note 62, at 152–53.
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Accordingly, if Anna, a film producer, incorporated expressive
elements from a short story by Bill in a path-breaking movie she
produced, our doctrine of inequivalents will shelter her from liability. The high level of originality and creativity in Anna’s work
should grant her privileged status under our proposed scheme,
even though she used protected elements from a preexisting work.
The inequivalents doctrine may be justified on grounds of both
efficiency and fairness. Works demonstrating exceptional creativity
significantly enrich society’s literary, artistic, and aesthetic experiences.70 Authors of exceptionally creative works therefore ought to
be both encouraged to produce them and rewarded for doing so.
Their creative efforts should not be stalled by the threat of copyright liability for non-imitative copying of other works.
This justification may encounter an objection from general property theory. Arguably, an expressive work that exhibits a scintilla
of creativity71 should belong to its author in the same categorical
way in which tangible assets belong to their owners. An asset
owner should be able to fend off unauthorized users by means of
self-help and by recourse to the legal system. She should also be
able to set a price for allowing other people to acquire or use her
asset. This regime is fair in that it protects the fruits of people’s
productive labor against encroachments and free-riding.72 This regime is also efficient in that it gives people a selfish reason for developing and protecting assets that improve society’s well-being.73
Arguably, these well-known justifications of ownership extend to
all assets that can be owned, rather than to tangible property alone.
70
See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1151, 1151 (2007) (“Creativity is universally agreed to be a good that copyright
law should seek to promote.”).
71
See, e.g., Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 118 (D.D.C.
2004), aff’d sub nom. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (describing originality as requiring independent creation and “just a scintilla of
creativity”).
72
See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L.
Rev. 1031, 1031–33 (2005) (discussing prevention of free-riding in intellectual property).
73
See, e.g., Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of
Copyright, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 421, 425 (1966) (explicating the prediction that “[t]he general welfare will . . . be enhanced by enacting copyright legislation which encourages the creation and publication of manuscripts that otherwise
would not have come into existence”).
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Expressive works, regardless of how original they are, are among
those assets.74 If so, authors of those works should be able to enjoin
others from unauthorized copying; at the very least, those who
copy an owned work should pay its author a market-price fee or
other equitable amount.75
We believe that this objection is overstated. An author who borrows from another’s work to create an exceptionally creative work
of her own does not appropriate the copied work in the traditional
property sense. Far from imitating or reproducing this work, the
author creates a novel and highly creative expressive work that integrates predominantly her original ideas. The closest property
analogue of the author’s action, therefore, is accession of assets,76
as opposed to misappropriation of another’s property. The accession in our context is special in that it does not destroy the copied
work, as in the case of accession of tangible inputs. Nor does expressive accession necessarily dilute the income-generating opportunities of the copied work’s owner. The owner can still sell his
work or allow others to use it for a fee in exactly the same way in
which he could do so before the accession. Furthermore, the linkage between the first work and the new creation increases the copied work’s visibility and promotes its sales.
Highly creative works are likely to enhance the value of the preexisting works from which they borrow. This fact distinguishes our
case from cases in which an unauthorized user uses the owner’s asset to create a new asset. When tangible assets are used in the
process of creating new ones, the original assets are often destroyed or transformed, and, in any event, the owner stands to lose
from the unauthorized use. Hence, the law seeks to reinstate the
74
See Hughes, supra note 61, at 291. For a recent philosophical defense of this
claim, see Jonathan Peterson, Lockean Property and Literary Works, 14 Legal Theory 257 (2008).
75
See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of
Intellectual Property, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1455, 1467 (2002) (“By creating and enforcing
exclusive rights in intellectual goods, copyrights . . . not only stifle unauthorized copying, but also enable authors and inventors to charge for the use of their works.”).
76
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 165–
75 (2007) (stating and explaining the principle of accession in property law); Thomas
W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership (May 2009) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1400902) (providing a
comprehensive analysis of accession principles and their economic and moral justifications).
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aggrieved owner’s wealth.77 This is not the case in the context of intangible goods. When the subsequent work falls into the category
of inequivalence, the original author suffers no real harm, and his
plea for remediation is unfounded.78
It is noteworthy that patent law has long recognized an exception similar to the one we seek to introduce into copyright law.79
Patent law’s doctrine of reverse equivalents limits the protection
granted to first-in-time patentees against genuine technological innovators whose inventions accomplish the same result described in
a prior patent, but in a wholly different way.80 As the Supreme
Court explained:
[W]here a device is so far changed in principle from a patented
article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal
words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used [in
reverse] to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee’s action for
81
infringement.

This doctrine of reverse equivalents in patent law is a conceptual
twin of our inequivalence doctrine. Although there are important
differences in the design and substance of the two doctrines,82 both
serve to bar liability in certain cases of literal infringement.

77
Merrill & Smith, supra note 76, at 171; see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742, 1766
(2007) (“The law of accession deals with situations in which one person mixes her labor or other inputs with someone else’s property. Generally, innocent improvers can
purchase the owner’s interest in the improved property . . . , but if the owner’s property is more valuable than the improvement, the improver can demand payment for
the added value but cannot keep the improved property.”).
78
Professor Henry Smith, supra note 77, at 1766–73, was first to analogize the acquisition of intellectual property rights to the rules of accession. Under his theory, intellectual property rights remunerate innovators who produce value by mixing their intellectual labor and other inputs with the information situated in the public domain.
79
See, e.g., Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit 417 (8th ed. 2007).
80
For discussions of the doctrine of reverse equivalents in modern patent law, see
5B Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 18.04[4], at 18-827 to -51 (2007); Charles
F. Pigott, Jr., Equivalents in Reverse, 48 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 291 (1966).
81
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950).
82
See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719,
731–49 (2009) (distinguishing between the peripheral protection of patents and the
exemplar-focused protection of copyright).
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Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.83 vividly illustrates how
our inequivalents doctrine can be operationalized. This cause célèbre featured Alice Randall, a young African-American novelist,
whose book The Wind Done Gone84 retold the story of Gone with
the Wind85 from the vantage point of the black characters. Randall’s
goal was to offer a very different portrayal of the South than that
offered in Margaret Mitchell’s classic. To achieve this goal, Randall
had to draw to some extent on Mitchell’s book. And she did.86 It
was undisputed that Randall referred to Gone with the Wind in the
foreword of her book;87 she mentioned key characters from
Mitchell’s book, albeit by different names;88 and she also borrowed
from their central relationships and scenes.89 It was also alleged
that Randall copied some dialogue from Gone with the Wind.90 This
allegation was disputed by Randall.
The trustee of Mitchell’s estate filed a copyright infringement
suit against Randall and her publisher, seeking injunctive relief
against both. The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a
preliminary injunction and enjoined Randall and her publisher
from distributing, offering, or even displaying the new book.91 The
Eleventh Circuit vacated the judgment of the District Court92 and
remanded for a finding on whether Randall’s book should be considered a parody of “Gone with the Wind.”93 Despite Randall’s extensive copying from Mitchell’s classic that normally amounts to an
infringement of copyright, the court acknowledged that a fair use
defense was available, and that, given its likelihood of success, the
injunction should be vacated.94
We agree with the outcome of the case, but not with the court’s
reasoning. We contend that, as a normative matter, the case should
have come under our doctrine of inequivalents. The court’s catego83

268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
Alice Randall, The Wind Done Gone (2001).
85
Margaret Mitchell, Gone With the Wind (Macmillan 1936).
86
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1259.
92
Id. at 1277.
93
Id.
94
Id.
84
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rization of Randall’s book as a “parody” was deeply problematic.95
This book is certainly not a parody in the conventional sense of the
term.96 Randall used Mitchell’s romanticized portrayal of the white
antebellum South as a background for her antithetical account of
the black slaves’ experience.97 Therefore, the court’s categorization
of The Wind Done Gone as a parody may have done injustice to
Randall’s literary achievement and hurt its sales. Yet, under extant
doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit did not have much of a choice.
We posit that our inequivalents doctrine provides a much more
promising venue for dealing with such works as The Wind Done
Gone. Under our framework, Randall’s book would not have been
infringing at all, and hence there would be no need for a strained
fair use analysis to salvage the work. Even though Randall invariably had to borrow certain elements from Mitchell’s book, her book
is brimming with originality. Indeed, Randall’s book possessed
such a high level of originality as to immunize it from an infringement suit from Mitchell’s estate. Randall’s creative effort produced
a book qualitatively different from Gone with the Wind. Randall
did not attempt to imitate the classic. Instead, she attempted—
successfully—to break new literary ground. The plaintiff’s portrayal of Randall’s book as an unauthorized sequel of Gone with
the Wind therefore seems specious. The two books are inequiva95
The court below thoroughly examined Randall’s novel and concluded that its
overall purpose was not to parody Gone With the Wind, but rather “to create a sequel
to the older work and provide Ms. Randall’s social commentary on the antebellum
South. . . . [that] retells the earlier story in a condensed version from a different perspective. . . .” Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1378
(N.D. Ga. 2001).
96
See, e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 902 (11th ed. 2003) (defining
“parody” as “a literary or musical work in which the style of an author or work is
closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule”); The Oxford Reference Dictionary
611 (Joyce M. Hawkins ed., 1986) (defining “parody” as “a humorous exaggerated
imitation of an author, literary work, style, etc.” and as “a grotesque imitation, a travesty”).
97
See Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Anarchist in the Library: How the Clash Between
Freedom and Control is Hacking the Real World and Crashing the System 84 (2004)
(explaining that “The Wind Done Gone is not a parody of Gone with the Wind. It is a
revision, a retelling of the classic from a critical stance in a vernacular voice. It’s also a
supplement, another perspective in the parallax view of race and history that the
United States desperately needs” and concluding that “[i]nstead of cheating by
stretching the definition of parody . . . the appeals court should have considered the
big questions: Does American copyright law protect works . . . in too many ways, and
with too many ancillary powers for the general good?”).
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lents. There is no reasonable way to perceive them differently.
Classifying Randall’s book as a non-infringing inequivalent would
have spared her the embarrassment of being labeled an infringer
that escaped liability by proving a defense. Likewise, it would have
saved Randall’s publisher the need to market her highly creative
novel as a parody.
Another case that fits under our inequivalents doctrine involves
the “epic” legal battle between Superman and “The Greatest
American Hero.”98 The owners of the copyright in Superman, the
famous fictional hero of films and books, brought copyright infringement allegations against the developers and broadcasters of a
television series featuring Ralph Hinkley as The Greatest American Hero.99 Both characters had superhuman powers, which they
used to defend the world against evil forces.100 They also closely resembled each other in their appearance, actions, and phrases.101
Hinkley’s personality and mental makeup, however, profoundly
differed from Superman’s.102 Superman was a fearless and proud
hero, who “performs his superhuman feats with skill, verve, and
dash . . . [as] the master of his own destiny.”103 Hinkley, in contrast,
acted “like a timid, reluctant hero, who accepts his missions grudgingly[,] prefers to get on with his normal life, . . . is perplexed by
the superhuman powers his costume confers and uses them in a
bumbling, comical fashion.”104
Based on these facts, the Second Circuit agreed with the trial
court’s finding that the two characters are not substantially similar
to each other105 and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suit.106
The court of appeals also mentioned “[t]he ‘parody’ branch of the
‘fair use’ doctrine” that serves as “a means of fostering the creativity protected by the copyright law” 107 and “balances the public interest in the free flow of ideas with the copyright holder’s interest
98

Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 238.
100
Id. at 236–37.
101
Id. at 237.
102
Id. at 243.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 245.
106
Id. at 235.
107
Id. at 242.
99
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in the exclusive use of his work.”108 This reference, however, was
merely parenthetical, since the court ultimately decided to align its
decision with the trial judge’s findings and reasoning.109
We contend that our inequivalents doctrine justifies the outcome
of the case more convincingly than the reasons chosen by the trial
and appellate courts. The courts’ similarity analysis is deficient for
a simple reason. Hinkley and Superman did not merely have similar superhuman powers, outfit, vocabulary, and achievements.
Viewers’ understanding of the two faces of Hinkley crucially depended on their familiarity with Superman. Hinkley was designed
as a hero-antihero whose personality sharply contrasted with the
unbendingly heroic personality of Superman. To establish this contrast, Hinkley’s creators had to imitate Superman’s features as
closely as possible, and they did so successfully. This imitation also
does not fit the category of “parody” because The Greatest American Hero attempted to achieve more than that and, arguably, succeeded. The authors of this work created a new fictional character
that broke new ground in the genre of heroic comics.110 This character was categorically different from his “only hero” predecessors,
and uniformly defeated Superman in one-sided copyright battles.111
The Greatest American Hero was an exceptionally creative work
that copyright law should encourage rather than block. This simple
fact prompted the courts to find a doctrine that would keep Hero
alive. Our normative analysis is not constrained by positive law.
We therefore propose to give exceptionally creative works—the
true inequivalents—an explicit exemption from liability for copying. Creators of these exceptional works benefit society strongly
enough to deserve this exemption.

108

Id.
Id. at 243–45.
The Greatest American Hero became a cult-TV classic after building a distinct
fanbase around the world. See, e.g., Jill Kipnis, Home Video Studios Seek Titles With
Niche Allure, Billboard, Apr. 2, 2005, at 31, available at http://www.imdb.com/news/
ni0751803/ (noting that “[r]ecent cult releases from Anchor Bay [Entertainment] include ‘The Greatest American Hero—Season One’”).
111
See American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d. at 235.
109
110
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B. The Added-Value Doctrine
The second doctrine we propose may be termed the “addedvalue doctrine.” We designed it to identify the desirable scope of
protection for authors of derivative works whose development involved copying from preexisting material and who do not qualify
for the safe harbor of the inequivalence doctrine.112 As a general
matter, authors are entitled to copyright protection only in their
original contributions; the protection does not extend to “the preexisting material employed in the work.”113 An author’s original
contribution receives full copyright protection even when it is very
modest.114 All authors, from highly original to virtually unoriginal,
have the power to enjoin others from copying their works and recover compensation for such copying.115
Apart from being costly to administer, these rules distort the
creators’ incentive to compete with each other for the market segment that values high originality. Under our added-value doctrine,
a copyright owner should only be able to enjoin works that are less
original than her own. Her work’s property-rule protection will not
exceed this limit. To secure injunctive relief against a putative infringer, the author will thus need to show that her work contains a
higher degree of originality relative to prior works than the infringer’s work relative to hers. Authors of works as original as
112

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “derivative work” as “a work based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted”); Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998)
(attesting that the definition of “derivative work” in 17 U.S.C. § 101 is “hopelessly
overbroad” because all works borrow something from prior art, and noting that only
substantial incorporation of preexisting materials will make a work “derivative” (citing Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984))); Gates Rubber Co. v.
Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 839 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a court decision
on whether an incorporation of preexisting material was substantial enough to make
the work derivative requires “a qualitative rather than a purely quantitative analysis”
(citing Whelan Assocs., v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1245 (3d Cir.
1986))).
113
17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2006); see also CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props.,
Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1515 (1st Cir. 1996) (observing that when an infringement allegation comprises a complaint about an “expression that is not proprietary to plaintiff,
then an essential ingredient is lacking from plaintiff’s prima facie case”).
114
See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
115
Id.
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those they copy from, and—a fortiori—authors whose works are
more original than those they copy from, will not be enjoined by
copyright law. Instead, the author whose work was copied will receive liability-rule protection and collect compensation measured
by the market value of the lifted expression.116 The goal of our design is to ensure, on the one hand, that authors receive compensation commensurate with the market value of their original contributions, and, on the other hand, that works containing greater
originality and creativity than the plaintiff’s protected work are not
expelled from the market.
Under this design, the defendant will carry the burden of proving her work’s equal or higher originality. The plaintiff will then
have to prove to the court the market value of the defendant’s use
of his work. Both burdens will be satisfied by a preponderance of
the evidence. Courts will apply these rules by relying on expert testimony and by making their own comparisons between works. This
task will be easier to perform than the controversial dissection analysis117 by which courts presently determine the copyright protection of works that combine both original and unoriginal elements.118
The added-value doctrine will promote creativity in two ways.
First, it will stimulate competition for originality among all authors.
Second, and equally important, the doctrine will afford greater
freedom to more creative authors of derivative works and lesser
freedom to authors whose derivative works are only modestly
original. The combined effect of those incentives and protections is
an environment that induces authors to optimize their creative ef116
In determining the appropriate compensation amounts, courts can rely on expert
witnesses and market data.
117
See 4 Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.03[A] at 1–34 (2008) (discussing difficulties of
the dissection analysis and other methods courts use in determining works’ similarity);
see also Sarah Brashears-Macatee, Total Concept and Feel or Dissection?: Approaches to the Misappropriation Test of Substantial Similarity, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
913 (1993) (discussing courts’ applications of the dissection analysis).
118
For authoritative formulation and application of the dissection analysis, see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442–47 (9th Cir. 1994). For other
cases in which courts relied on the dissection method, see Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608–10 (1st Cir. 1988); Mattel, Inc. v. AzrakHamway Int’l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field
& Co., 675 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1982); Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F.
Supp. 353, 358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Farmers Independent Telephone Co. v. Thorman,
648 F. Supp. 457, 460–61 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
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forts—an incentive that will likely increase the development of
original and creative works.
The doctrine’s allocation of the burden of proof conforms to the
general principles of evidence law.119 These principles require a
plaintiff to establish his cause of action by a preponderance of the
evidence, while placing a similar burden on the defendant who relies on an affirmative defense.120 Our inequivalents doctrine places
a heavier burden on the alleged infringer: she can establish her
work’s exceptional creativity and inequivalence only by clear and
convincing evidence.121 As we explained, this proof burden will separate works that are unequivocally exceptional in their originality
from those that are not.122 Because authors of such exceptional
works will get a full exemption from copyright liability, court decisions that erroneously grant this exemption to an author will cause
serious harm: annihilation of a well-earned copyright to the benefit
of an opportunistic free-rider and the ex ante distortion of the incentive to create original works. The law consequently needs to
impose on alleged infringers a stringent proof requirement that will
minimize the incidence of those erroneous deprivations. The
added-value doctrine need not incorporate such a requirement because it does not give defendants a complete exemption from copyright liability. Under this doctrine, a defendant who copies another’s work to create an equally or more original work of her own
will not go scot-free. Any such defendant will have to pay the copied work’s owner a market-priced fee.
We illustrate our added-value doctrine through the case of Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc.,123 which involved a technologically complex and fundamentally important dispute. There, the court was
asked to address compatibility-driven copying of computer software as an issue of first impression.124 A company operating parking garages needed computer software for its operations. It retained two engineers, who worked on the software development as
independent contractors. The engineers failed to develop a pro119

Stein, supra note 62, at 219–25.
Id.
121
See supra Section III.A.
122
Id.
123
79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996).
124
Id. at 1536–37.
120
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gram with which the company felt comfortable, and the parties dissolved their engagement.125 The company subsequently used parts
of the engineers’ copyrighted software to develop a program with
which it could work.126 The engineers sued the company, claiming
that this use infringed their copyright.127 The company’s defense relied on the “compatibility exception”—a proposition that copying
from another’s software does not violate copyright to the extent it
was dictated by interface-compatibility requirements.128
This proposition holds that certain components of a computer
program—namely, the interface components—set up communication between the hardware, the operating system, and specificapplication programs. To secure unimpeded communication
throughout the system, these components must be mutually compatible.129 Ideally, they must also be standard in order to minimize
learning costs for computer users.130 Making compatibility-driven
copying actionable in copyright would give interface developers a
colossal monopolistic power, while depriving the users—and society at large—of crucial network benefits.131 Based on this theory,
the company argued that its use of the engineers’ software was
compatibility-driven and did not exceed the dictates of compatibility.132 Furthermore, it urged the court to filter out portions of the
engineers’ software that were dictated by the interface with its garage-management program.133 The company requested the trial
judge to instruct the jury about the compatibility exception, but the
judge denied that request.134 Subsequently, the jury decided the
case in the engineers’ favor, and the company appealed.135
The appellate court granted the company’s appeal without fitting
its decision into a specific doctrinal niche. It held that, although in125

Id. at 1538–39.
Id. at 1539–40.
127
Id. at 1540.
128
Id. at 1546.
129
See Timothy S. Teter, Note, Merger and the Machines: An Analysis of the ProCompatibility Trend in Computer Software Copyright Cases, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1061,
1063–65 (1993).
130
Id. at 1065.
131
Id. at 1067.
132
Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1537, 1546.
133
Id. at 1540.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 1536.
126
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terface specifications are copyrightable in principle, compatibility
demands “may work to deny copyright protection to certain portions of a computer program.”136 As far as doctrine is concerned,
the court ruled that “[w]hether the protection is unavailable because these factors render the expression unoriginal, nonexpressive
per [Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act], or whether these factors
compel a finding of fair use, copyright estoppel, or misuse, the result is to deny copyright protection to portions of the computer
program.”137
This decision obviously fails to deliver a criterion by which to
distinguish between interface specifications that are copyrightable
and those that are not. Among the academic formulations of the
required criterion, two stand out as attractive.138 Both formulations
rely on the idea/expression merger doctrine.139 The two formulations, however, set different conditions for removing the copyright
protection from interface software and for allowing compatibilitydriven copying of interface specifications. Under one of those formulations, interface specifications necessary for achieving compatibility should be categorized as unprotected “ideas,” as opposed
to protected “expressions.”140 Under another, more restrictive formulation, an interface element would be classified as an “idea” after actually attaining a de facto industry standard status.141 Each of
those proposals acknowledges its dependency on a legal doctrine

136

Id. at 1547.
Id.
138
See Teter, supra note 129, at 1067–68 (“Two frequently raised innovation arguments militate against allowing copying to achieve compatibility, but both are inconclusive at best. The ‘incentive’ innovation argument maintains that if interface software can be copied to the extent necessary to achieve compatibility, developers will
not bother to create new interfaces . . . . The second innovation concern, the
‘QWERTY argument,’ notes that due to the user’s costs of abandoning an old standard, standardization both constrains design and stifles innovation.”); see also Peter S.
Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1329,
1340–41 (1987) (balancing costs and benefits in designing legal protection for intellectual work).
139
See Teter, supra note 129, at 1072 (relating compatibility and the merger doctrine).
140
Id.
141
See Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1045, 1101 (1989).
137
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that is notoriously difficult to apply, but claims to be an optimal solution of a difficult problem.142
The added-value doctrine resolves this problem in a simple and
intuitive fashion without invoking the fuzzy distinction between
“ideas” and “expressions.” The doctrine will require the court to
determine whether the allegedly infringing computer program is
original. If it is, the programmer’s copying of interface specifications from another program will be permitted, subject to compensation. The defendant’s creative endeavor will not be suppressed
by the interface developer, but she would have to pay the plaintiff
the market price of the copied interface software. If this software is
not generally accessible, the developer would be entitled to compensation that the court would determine with the help of experts.
In cases in which the copied part is publicly available code, either
because it is a non-protected standard or open-source code, the
compensation amount will be zero. This straightforward liabilityrule solution would allow developers of computer programs to internalize the benefits they produce without blocking each others’
innovative efforts.143
Our second illustration of the added-value doctrine is AcuffRose v. Jostens.144 This case featured a plaintiff whose work was not
original enough to receive full copyright protection that includes
injunctive relief, but was sufficiently creative to qualify for the liability-rule protection under our added-value doctrine. The court,
however, dismissed the plaintiff’s entire suit. As we will now explain, this outcome resulted from the court’s interpretation of existing copyright doctrines that divert courts’ attention from the
straightforward added-value analysis.

142

See id. at 1103; Teter, supra note 129, at 1066–72 .
Note that our proposal does not chill creative inventors of path-breaking interface programs. Any such program can be patented. The Bateman court acknowledged
it by observing that “[i]t is particularly important to exclude methods of operation and
processes from the scope of copyright in computer programs because much of the
contents of computer programs is patentable. Were we to permit an author to claim
copyright protection for those elements of the work that should be the province of
patent law, we would be undermining the competitive principles that are fundamental
to the patent system.” Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1541 n.21; see also Menell, supra note 141,
at 1103; cf. Miller, supra note 9 (proposing to model copyright protection on a standard akin to the non-obviousness requirement of patent law).
144
155 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1998).
143
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The defendant promoted sales of class rings by using the slogan
“U Got 2 Stand 4 Something.”145 This slogan portrayed the ring as a
symbol of its wearer’s social identity and affiliation to his or her
school.146 The slogan was identical to the name of Aaron Tippin’s
famous cowboy lyric “You’ve Got to Stand for Something” that
repeatedly uses the expression, “You’ve got to stand for something
or you’ll fall for anything.”147 The song’s copyright owner sued the
defendant for copyright infringement. The defendant denied
wrongdoing, claiming that the phrase “You’ve got to stand for
something” is an unprotected cliché that belongs to the public domain.148 As an alternative, the defendant raised the “fair use” defense.149
The defendant’s denial of copying was untrustworthy. The creation and approval of its advertising campaign coincided with the
song’s peaking popularity.150 The campaign’s advertisement almost
expressly acknowledged copying from the song by stating that
“The song says it best: If you don’t stand for something, you’ll fall
for anything.”151 The identity between the defendant’s campaign
slogan and Tippin’s famous line therefore could not be accidental.
Unsurprisingly, the court determined that the defendant copied the
slogan from the song.152 This determination, however, did not avail
the plaintiff because the court accepted the defendant’s second
claim and held that the contested phrase is, indeed, a cliché.153 This
holding relied on numerous documented uses of the phrase “If you
145
146

Acuff-Rose Music v. Jostens Inc., 988 F. Supp. 289, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
The defendant’s sales brochures, fliers, and posters read:
The song says it best: If you don’t stand for something, you’ll fall for anything.
And one of the best ways to show you stand for something is by wearing a Jostens Class Ring. The ring stands for your school. It stands for the people you
know. It stands for the greatest class of all time (yours, of course). And it stands
for the things you do to make your class the greatest. Most of all, it stands for
you. The gold, the stone, the inscriptions, they add up to nothing less than a
small piece of your personal history. The ring stands for who you are—and
that’s something worth standing for.

Id.
147

Acuff-Rose, 155 F.3d at 141.
Acuff-Rose, 988 F. Supp. at 290.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 293.
151
Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
152
Id. at 293.
153
Id. at 295.
148
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don’t stand for something, you will fall for anything” in sermons,
political speeches, and newspaper articles that bore no connection
to Tippin’s song.154
We believe that this decision is flawed. The decision failed to
address the significance of the defendant’s copying from Tippin’s
song. The defendant’s campaign used the phrase “You’ve got to
stand for something or you’ll fall for anything” as appearing in that
song. The defendant did not use this phrase as a cliché, nor did it
refer to similar phrases that appeared in sermons, political
speeches, or elsewhere in the public domain. Most crucially, the defendant’s advertisement of the ring alluded specifically to the
song’s line “You’ve got to stand for something or you’ll fall for
anything.”155 The defendant designated this line to be the focus of
its prospective buyers’ attention. This designation constituted an
almost explicit acknowledgment of the song’s creativity and
prominence. The defendant therefore could not even deny that the
song’s line exhibited a “scintilla”156 or “modicum”157 of creativity—
the originality level that the law deems sufficient for establishing
copyright protection.158 Nor could the defendant deny the fact that
it traded on the public approbation of Tippin’s efforts.159
The court’s ruling against the plaintiff also relied on the fact that
Tippin’s lyric represented “a moral lesson in the form of a father’s
advice to his son to live a principled life,”160 while the defendant’s
campaign extolled the virtue of wearing the advertised ring as a
symbol of social status and achievement.161 Based on this fact, the
court concluded that “the ‘total concept and feel’ of the two works
differ dramatically.”162 This inference, however, resulted from the
154

Id.
Id. at 291.
156
Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 118 (D.D.C. 2004).
157
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991); see also 1
Nimmer, supra note 117, § 2.01[A] & [B].
158
1 Nimmer, supra note 117, § 2.01[A] & [B].
159
See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2nd Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.) (rationalizing
a musician’s copyright entitlement as protecting “his interest in the potential financial
returns from his compositions which derive from the lay public’s approbation of his
efforts”).
160
Acuff-Rose, 988 F. Supp. at 296.
161
Id.
162
Id. (quoting Kretschmer v. Warner Bros., 1994 WL 259814, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June
8, 1994)).
155
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court’s failure to consider the works’ common theme: approbation
of people who “belong to something” by virtue of having ironclad
commitments and affiliations.
The defendant undoubtedly expanded the meaning of Tippin’s
phrase in an original way. This expansion, however, was not exceptionally creative and thus did not turn the defendant’s use of the
phrase into an inequivalent. Notice that the defendant’s campaign
did not contribute to the popularity of Tippin’s song. On the contrary, it attempted to profit from the song’s popularity. Our theory
therefore calls for the application of the added-value doctrine. This
doctrine would have afforded the song’s owner a liability-rule protection, forcing the defendant to compensate the owner for the unauthorized use of the song. As for the compensation amount,
courts should be able to determine it by relying on experts and
common sense. Courts will not make such determinations easily.
This difficulty, however, is not insurmountable and it hardly provides a good reason for turning copyrighted works into a fair game
for opportunists.
The added-value doctrine has a socially desirable implication for
cases involving plaintiffs whose works’ originality is only slight. We
exemplify this implication by a battle of T-shirts found in Matthews
v. Freedman.163 A souvenir children’s T-shirt that the plaintiff designed and marketed featured a slogan, “Someone Went to Boston
and got me this shirt because they love me Very much.” This slogan was surrounded by small drawings of a fish, a sailboat, a lobster, Faneuil Hall, and scattered hearts. A souvenir children’s Tshirt designed and marketed by the defendant told the world
“Someone Who Loves Me Went to Boston and Got Me this Shirt.”
This slogan was surrounded by small drawings of a fish, a sailboat,
a lobster, a swan boat, ducklings, and a smiling sun. The two designers confronted each other at the Boston Gift Show and subsequently in court.164
Both the trial court and the First Circuit found no infringement
of copyright in the defendant’s T-shirt.165 The two T-shirts were
strikingly similar to each other. The defendant, in all likelihood,

163

157 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1998).
Id. at 26.
165
Id. at 27–28.
164
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copied the plaintiff’s T-shirt design. Both T-shirts, however, exhibited a trivial compilation of ideas, expressions, and images easily
extractable from the public domain.166 Because of this lack of originality, the courts held that the plaintiff’s T-shirt deserves only weak
protection against complete literal copying.167 The defendant’s Tshirt was not completely identical to the plaintiff’s. The defendant
consequently won the suit.168
The courts’ decision to scale the plaintiff’s protection down and
unlock the added value of the competitor’s product perfectly aligns
with our proposal. Our added-value doctrine would yield exactly
the same result. Given the plaintiff’s almost invisible addition to
prior art, any difference between her and the defendant’s T-shirt
design would allow the defendant to win the originality contest or,
alternatively, establish that his design of the T-shirt was as original
as hers. As far as compensation is concerned, the plaintiff’s eligibility for that remedy will depend on the market value of the expression that the defendant borrowed from her work. The plaintiff
would obviously fail to prove that her addition to phrases and images extractable for free from the public domain had any value on
the market. Adjudicators applying the added-value doctrine would
consequently have to dismiss her suit.169
C. THE SAMENESS RULE
Our third doctrinal proposal, the “sameness rule,” is different
from the first two doctrines we advanced. It is designed to penalize
copiers and imitators whose works are plainly unoriginal. It also
bears emphasis that our sameness rule resembles the copyright infringement analysis adopted by the Seventh Circuit, although we
believe that our design improves upon that circuit’s approach. The
primary purpose of this rule is to deter creators from copying prior
works and incentivize them to ensure that their works contain at
least some originality. The rule’s secondary purpose is to
166

Id.
Id.
168
Id.
169
The outcome of that suit would be different if the plaintiff could establish literal
copying of her design by the defendant. The court would then enjoin the defendant.
The plaintiff, however, would still have difficulties in proving her compensable damage.
167
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strengthen the copyright protection of original creators, whose
works—after becoming successful—entice copying and imitation.
An author who copies a prior work of another person does not
merely fail the test for originality. By and large, he also acknowledges that the copied work is original and valuable.
The sameness rule achieves its desiderata by setting up a strong
presumption of copyright infringement in cases featuring striking
similarity between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s works. To
benefit from this rule, the plaintiff will have to establish that her
and the defendant’s works are identical, or at least strikingly similar to each other, and bear no similarity to a work or object in the
public domain. The plaintiff will also have to prove that she created her work before the defendant created hers. Based on these
facts, the court will deem the plaintiff’s work original and deserving
of protection against reproduction and imitation by others. The defendant will then be able to rebut this presumption by adducing
clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff’s work itself is ineligible for copyright protection or that she created her own work
independently. If the defendant fails to establish one of those defenses, the court would hold her responsible for infringing the
plaintiff’s copyright. The clear and convincing evidence requirement will thus solidify the protection of authors of original works
and deter free-riders.
The inequivalents doctrine and the sameness rule both aim at calibrating a defendant’s liability to the degree of originality in her
work. Yet, the two doctrines operate at the opposite extremes of
the originality spectrum. The inequivalents doctrine operates at the
high end of the originality spectrum, where it attempts to grant
immunity to defendants whose works contain significant originality. The sameness rule, by contrast, operates at the low end of the
originality spectrum, where it increases the potential liability of defendants whose works possess little to no originality.
The sameness rule thus induces originality by incentivizing the
production of novel works that substantially differ from those that
already exist. Creation of a highly original work will guarantee its
author not only the highest degree of protection but also complete
immunity against suit. Authors who wish to take advantage of the
inequivalents doctrine may need to research preexisting expressive
works and distinguish their works from them. The breadth of that
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research will depend on its cost and the author’s expected benefit
from the contemplated work. Creators of works that have high expected value consequently will have a strong incentive to intensify
the preemption search. The search, admittedly, can never be perfect in light of the number of expressive works that already exist.
Nevertheless, it can help authors in distinguishing their works from
preexisting expressions.
As we already mentioned, our sameness rule aims to preserve
the independent creation defense recognized by extant copyright
law, and it is designed to do so. That said, we need to post a caveat
here. In the real world, there is a risk that courts will tend to infer
infringement whenever there is striking similarity between two
works. Based on an experience-driven presumption against coincidences, courts may decide that such a high level of similarity is never accidental, and if so, they might sometimes trample upon the independent creation defense by erroneously identifying as
infringement some cases of independent creation. We are also cognizant of the fact that the clear and convincing evidence requirement that we impose on defendants will exacerbate this risk. This
allocation of the risk of error will achieve the following effect: relative to the general rule that imposes the burden of proof on the
plaintiff, the incidence of false negatives (decisions erroneously
denying the claim of independent creation) will increase, while the
incidence of false positives (decisions erroneously granting the
claim) will decrease.170 Hence, the sameness rule enhances the protection of highly original authors at the price of exposing independent creators of works that are similar to preexisting works to
an increased risk of copyright liability.171 From an ex post perspective, this tradeoff is far from obvious. Yet, the proper way to examine its effects is to evaluate the ex ante incentives for independent
creators. Those creators would have to preserve evidence demon170
Tradeoff between false positives and false negatives is what evidentiary rules
generally do: see Stein, supra note 62, at 133–40. Formulation of evidentiary rules
therefore should always reflect societal preferences in the allocation of the risk of error that vary from one category of cases to another. Id. at 118–33.
171
It should be emphasized that the increase in risk is very small because even under
current doctrines independent creation is very difficult to establish and defendants
whose works are identical or strikingly similar to those of the plaintiffs fare very
poorly in court. So, in practice, our amendment will worsen the lot of independent
creators only marginally.
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strating that they created their works independently. Because preserving such self-regarding evidence is easy, creators that are truly
independent would virtually always be able to prove their defense.
These creators would easily separate their true claims from the
false defenses of independent creation.
The Seventh Circuit case of Ty v. GMA Accessories172 illustrates
how the sameness rule will penalize unoriginal creators. This case
was resolved by Chief Judge Posner’s decision that affirmed a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from selling a toy similar to a bean-bag pig copyrighted and marketed by the plaintiff.173
Chief Judge Posner began his analysis of the case by observing that
the two pigs are “nearly identical.”174 Identity, of course, does not
entail copying that the law proscribes: “if independent creation results in an identical work, the creator of that work is free to sell
it.”175 Showing a striking similarity between the two works, however, can establish copying—and it can do so, according to Chief
Judge Posner, even in the absence of an independent demonstration that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work.176 This
showing, however, must be accompanied by evidence proving the
protected work’s uniqueness. Specifically, the plaintiff must prove
that he did not copy an object or a work that exists in the public
domain from which the defendant could copy as well. As Chief
Judge Posner explained, similarity between works replicating the
same thing in the public domain “may be striking without being
suspicious.”177
172

132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1169, 1173.
174
Id. at 1169.
175
Id. (citing Grubb v. KMS Patriots, L.P., 88 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)); Selle v. Gibb,
741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984). The court also explained the rule’s practical rationale:
[T]he creator of an expressive work—an author or sculptor or composer—
cannot canvass the entire universe of copyrighted works to discover whether his
poem or song or, as in this case, “soft sculpture” is identical to some work in
which copyright subsists, especially since unpublished, unregistered works are
copyrightable.
Id.
176
As the court explains, “[the defendant] must produce evidence of access, all
right—but, as we have just said . . . a similarity that is so close as to be highly unlikely
to have been an accident of independent creation is evidence of access.” Id. at 1170.
177
Id. The court illustrates this proposition by “two people photographing Niagara
Falls from the same place at the same time of the day and year and in identical weath173
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Once the plaintiff proves that the defendant’s work is similar to
his but not to anything else in the public domain, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant.178 The defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that she created her work independently rather than copied the plaintiff’s work.179 Chief Judge
Posner held in this regard that the defendant’s evidence of independent creation ought to be more detailed and, consequently,
more persuasive than a generic claim that the work was independently created.180 This evidence must explain away the suspicion arising from the similarity between the defendant’s design and the
plaintiff’s work.181 The defendant’s explanation also needs to specify the choices she made with regard to her design’s individual features.182
The defendant in Ty failed to provide such evidence and consequently was unable to defeat the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction.183 The outcome in this case was due to the complete
originality of the plaintiff’s toy and the complete unoriginality of
the defendant’s product. As Chief Judge Posner explained, the
plaintiff’s bean-bag pig had a fictional appearance that was original
and unique.184 This appearance starkly differed from that of natural
and lifelike toy pigs.185 The unique appearance of the plaintiff’s toy
er.” Id.; see also First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 342
F. Supp. 178, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“[A] copyright on a work which bears practically a
photographic likeness to the natural article, as here, is likely to prove a relatively
weak copyright.”).
178
Ty, 132 F.3d at 1171.
179
Id. (holding that “[a]ccess (and copying) may be inferred when two works are so
similar to each other and not to anything in the public domain that it is likely that the
creator of the second work copied the first, but the inference can be rebutted by disproving access or otherwise showing independent creation”).
180
Id. at 1171–72.
181
Id.
182
In Chief Judge Posner’s words:
Silence can be pregnant; the absence of any evidence of how the [defendant’s]
designer’s drawing was translated into the Squealer-resembling production
model, combined with the similarity of that model to Squealer (and to nothing in
the public domain) . . . overbore the weak evidence of the [designer’s] affidavit.
Id.
183
Id. at 1173.
184
Id. at 1170.
185
As Chief Judge Posner put it, “[r]eal pigs are not the only pigs in the public domain. But GMA has not pointed to any fictional pig in the public domain that Preston
resembles.” Id.
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pig was a major contributor to its commercial success. The defendant made an opportunistic attempt at sharing this success by developing a similarly looking toy.
Under our sameness rule, the plaintiff in Ty would receive the
highest degree of copyright protection for her original work. The
plaintiff would be entitled to enjoin the unoriginal defendant from
replicating her toy (and making profits from that replication). The
rule’s application would thus make copyright protection coextensive with the originality of the works in question. Chief Judge Posner’s decision in Ty squarely aligns with the sameness rule and
promotes its goals.186
Application of the sameness rule will not always produce the
same results as extant doctrine. We illustrate this point with another Seventh Circuit opinion, Selle v. Gibb.187 This case featured a
complaint by Ronald Selle, a composer, that the Bee Gees’ hit tune
“How Deep Is Your Love” had infringed the copyright of his song
“Let It End.”188 After trial, the jury decided that the alleged infringement took place, but the judge granted Bee Gees’ motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.189 Selle appealed.
The court affirmed the trial judge’s decision and ended the litigation that threatened the famous creators and performers of pop
music with embarrassment and financial losses.190 The court’s dismissal of Selle’s appeal was based on the appraisal of the tunes’
186
A more recent decision of the Seventh Circuit, JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc.,
482 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2007), is equally illustrative. This case featured an infringement
suit by one plush doll manufacturer against another that replicated its doll. The plaintiff’s doll, although peculiar, was highly original and created a niche market for itself.
Id. at 912–13. Aware of the success of the plaintiff’s product, the defendant sought to
compete with it by offering a similarly designed doll that replicated the total look and
feel of the plaintiff’s doll. Id. The plaintiff sued the defendant for copyright infringement and obtained a summary judgment. The defendant appealed. Id. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. It acknowledged that the plaintiff’s doll
evoked social stereotypes and humor that exist in the public domain, but held that the
doll’s unique combination of features singles it out as an original expression of these
phenomena that deserves copyright protection. Id. at 916. Most importantly, the Circuit used the originality of the plaintiff’s doll as a proxy for its determination that the
defendant copied it. This ruling implicitly acknowledges that a work’s originality correlates with the level of copyright protection it will receive.
187
741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
188
Id. at 898.
189
Id.
190
Id.
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similarity.191 The court decided that this similarity was not striking
enough. This decision overrode the opinion of the only expert who
testified about the tunes’ similarity. This expert was a renowned
professor of music from the Northwestern University, whose testimony unequivocally supported Selle’s complaint of copyright infringement.192 The expert compared the two songs’ musical notes
and found that “the first eight bars of each song . . . have twentyfour of thirty-four notes in plaintiff’s composition and twenty-four
of forty notes in defendants’ composition which are identical in
pitch and symmetrical position” and that “[o]f thirty-five rhythmic
impulses in plaintiff’s composition and forty in defendants’, thirty
are identical.”193 The expert also pointed to striking similarities between the notes and rhythmic impulses in the last four bars of the
songs.194 Based on these similarities, the expert opined that the
songs could not have been composed independently of one another
and that he had never encountered two songs by different composers that are so similar to each other.195
Bee Gees did not call expert witnesses. Instead, its singer, songwriter and producer, Barry Gibb, testified that “How Deep Is Your
Love” was the group’s independent creation.196 The group’s manager and two musicians corroborated this testimony.197 The work
tape of “How Deep Is Your Love” indicated that its singers, the
Gibb brothers, hummed and sang the tune to a keyboard player,
who subsequently played it on his keyboard.198 Bee Gees’ witnesses
authenticated this tape as a contemporaneous record of the song’s
creation.199
Two facts were not in controversy. Selle’s song “Let It End” was
created and copyrighted before the creation of “How Deep Is
Your Love.”200 The public dissemination of “Let It End” was minimal. Selle and his band played the song two or three times in the
191

Id. at 901–06.
Id. at 899.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 898.
192
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Chicago area. Selle also sent the song to eleven music recording
and publishing companies. These companies showed no interest in
the song.201
The court based its decision to dismiss the appeal on a theory
that attributed a miscalculation to Selle’s expert. According to that
theory, the expert underestimated the probability of the tunes’ accidental sameness. This probability is much higher than estimated
by the expert because the genre of pop music is simplistic by design. All pop songs are relatively short and build on repeated patterns that are mostly not unique.202 Two independently composed
melodies therefore may contain many accidental similarities. Alternatively, similar melodies may originate from a common
source.203 This genre-specific reality erodes the significance of
“striking similarity” evidence. Factfinders cannot deduce from this
evidence that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s melody
and copied it.204 The plaintiff consequently needs to adduce independent evidence of access.205 Selle’s failure to adduce such evidence doomed his suit to dismissal without a new trial.206
We believe that this ruling was unjustified. We are puzzled by
the court’s attribution of musical minimalism and homogeneity to
the entire pop genre. Any musical genre accommodates compositions that occupy different positions on the originality spectrum.
Some compositions score high on that spectrum, and some score
low. The Bee Gees’ song “How Deep Is Your Love” scored low
because its melody was similar to “Let It End.” Selle testified that
“Let It End” was his original creation and Bee Gees did not dispute it. Nor did the group advance a “prior common source” claim.
Instead, it argued that “How Deep Is Your Love” is its independent creation. Because Selle’s song preceded that creation, its score
on the originality spectrum was superior. Under the sameness rule,
therefore, the case would go to trial. The Bee Gees would then
have to prove their independent creation claim by clear and convincing evidence. If they fail to do so, Selle would win the case.
201

Id.
Id. at 905.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 904–05.
206
Id. at 905–06.
202
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CONCLUSION
Herman Melville famously observed that “it is better to fail in
originality than to succeed in imitation.”207 This saying certainly
captures a deep-seated human intuition. Throughout history, societies always had a special interest in original and highly creative
works of art and expression. It is not surprising therefore that
originality and creativity were selected as the gatekeepers of our
copyright system. Yet, the existing copyright system does not use
these two criteria properly. By assigning a very minimal role to
these criteria, the system deprived society of a considerable expressive wealth that could have been realized under a more efficient
and just design.
In this Article, we sought to remedy this design flaw by proposing an originality-based framework for reshaping our copyright
law. Our goal was to calibrate protection and liability to the level
of originality of works. Instead of using originality and creativity as
threshold requirements whose satisfaction makes an owner eligible
for uniformly strong copyright protection, we utilized originality
and creativity as continuums and varied the scope of rights and liabilities in accordance with a sliding originality scale. In so doing,
we remained mindful of practicability constraints and supplemented our substantive legal mechanisms with evidentiary rules
that should assist courts in implementing our proposal. We demonstrated that an originality-based copyright system can help overcome some of the main shortcomings of the current regime and
lead to the production of more original and creative works. To return to Melville’s quote, many believe that the current copyright
system “succeeds in imitation and fails in originality.” We proposed a way to turn things around and put copyright law back on
track.

207

Herman Melville, Hawthorne and His Mosses, The Literary World, Aug. 17 & 24,
1850, available at http://www.ibiblio.org/eldritch/nh/hahm.html.

